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CONSTRUCTION LAW
D. Stan Barnhill*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will review recent legislation and judicial decisions
in Virginia affecting owners, contractors, and design professionals
in the construction context. The discussion will include legislative
amendments to the Code of Virginia ("Code") by the General As-
sembly promulgated in 1990 and the first half of 1991, as well as
important cases on construction law decided by Virginia's state
and federal courts for the last half of 1989, 1990, and the first half
of 1991.
II. LEGISLATION
The General Assembly was not exceptionally active in the 1990
and 1991 legislative sessions in areas affecting the construction in-
dustry. The laws that did pass generally fell within four categories:
regulation of contractors; changes in public procurement law; the
establishment of an alternative venue for litigation or arbitration
of construction contract disputes; and the broadening of civil ac-
tions that may be brought against the Virginia Department of
Transportation.
A. Regulation of Contractors
In 1990, the General Assembly changed the scope and nature of
regulation governing contractors in Virginia. The new legislation,
which became effective on January 1, 1991, amended numerous
sections of Article 1 of Title 54.1 of the Code.'
* Partner, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, Roanoke and Danville, Virginia; B.S., 1971, Vir-
ginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; M.S., 1973, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University; J.D., 1983, Washington and Lee University. Mr. Barnhill is currently
on the Board of Governors of the Construction Law Section, Virginia State Bar, and a mem-
ber of the Forum on the Construction Industry of the American Bar Association. The author
wishes to thank Daniel S. Brown, a partner in Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-1100 to -1115 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
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One principal change effectuated by the amendments was to re-
quire Class B contractors to obtain and maintain a license to work
as contractors in Virginia. 2 Prior to this change, Class B contrac-
tors needed only to be "registered" to do business in the state.3
With the amendments, Class B contractors are now subject to es-
sentially the same regulations that govern Class A contractors.
The General Assembly also amended both the definitions of
"Class A" and "Class B" contractors to include not only the actual
performance of construction, but also the management of construc-
tion as well.4 The obvious intent of this amendment was to bring
construction managers within the scope of licensure.5
In addition, the General Assembly amended the law in 1990 to
impose additional requirements on any person or entity seeking li-
censure in Virginia as a Class A or Class B contractor. Any such
contractor must now employ a full-time "designated employee"
who is over 18 years of age and has taken and passed, on behalf of
the contractor, an examination administered by the Virginia Board
of Contractors. If the "designated employee" should cease working
for the contractor after passing the exam, the contractor has ninety
days to notify the Board of a qualified substitute in order to main-
tain licensure. The General Assembly included a grandfather
clause in section 54.1-1108.1 which excludes from full compliance
all contractors licensed and in business before January 1, 1991.8
Grandfathered contractors may instead submit a name of one of
their full-time employees to the Board as their "designated em-
ployee," without that person having passed the Board's examina-
tion. Should that employee, however, later cease to be associated
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-1108. A "Class B" contractor is defined in the Code as one in-
volved in construction work having a value for any one project or contract of between $1,500
and $40,000; or involving the building of a groundwater well, regardless of contract value.
Id. § 54.1-1100. In contrast, a "Class A" contractor is defined as one involved in construction
work having a value for any one project or contract of $40,000 or more; or having a total
value for all projects in a given year of $300,000 or more. Id.
3. Id. § 54.1-1108 (Repl. Vol. 1988) (repealed 1990).
4. Id. § 54.1-1100 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
5. Construction managers are hired by the owner to coordinate and manage the non-de-
sign aspects of the construction process. These professionals first appeared in the 1970s to
provide the owner an alternative to the traditional practice of relying solely on the architect
and general contractor to manage the construction. See Schenk, Construction Wars: Part II.
Risk and the Construction Manager: A Continuing Development, 24 REAL PROP., PROBATE
& TRUST J. 593, 594 (1990).
6. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-1100, -1106, -1108 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
7. Id. §§ 54.1-1106, -1108.
8. Id. § 54.1-1108.1.
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with the grandfathered contractor, that contractor will then have
to comply with the new law by designating 'an employee who has
passed the Board's examination.9
Two final changes in legislation governing contractors are worthy
of mention. In both 1990 and 1991, the General Assembly added to
the powers of the Board of Contractors. First, the General Assem-
bly amended section 54.1-1110 of the Code by granting the Board
the authority to require remedial education of a contractor found
to have violated state law governing contractor practice.10 Prior to
the amendment, the Board possessed only the powers of denial or
revocation of license under this section."'
Second, in 1991 the General Assembly again augmented the
powers of the Board of Contractors by the amendment of section
54.1-1102 of the Code.12 Pursuant to this amendment, the Board
now has the authority to promulgate regulations requiring residen-
tial contractors, not engaged in routine maintenance or service
contracts, to enter into legible written contracts with consumers.
The Board can require that these written contracts specify the
work to be performed; the fixed price or an estimate of the cost of
the work; the schedule and amount of progress payments; a timeta-
ble for when the work will be completed; the amount of any down
payment; a listing of any specific materials requested by the con-
sumers; and identification business information about the contrac-
tor.-3 The Board can require that a contractor soliciting work door-
to-door provide the consumer with a "statement of protections" as
well. 1 4
B. Public Procurement
In 1990 and 1991, the General Assembly passed several amend-
ments to Virginia's Public Procurement Act. 15 The effect of each
amendment is to require that public bodies include in their con-
struction contracts additional clauses designed to protect the inter-
ests of contractors or their subcontractors.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 54.1-1110.
11. Id. § 54.1-1110 (Repl. Vol. 1988) (repealed 1990).
12. Id. § 54.1-1102 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. §§ 11-35 to -80 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1991).
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In 1990, the General Assembly added a new section to Article 2.1
of the Act.1" This new section, 11-62.11, obligates any contractor in
contractual privity with a public body to pay its subcontractors
within seven days of receipt of payment from the public body for
work performed by the subcontractor. 7 Furthermore, the public
body's contract with the contractor must specify that the subcon-
tractor will receive interest on any money not paid within the
seven-day statutory period. The interest rate is one percent per
month unless a different rate is prescribed in the contract.'8 Sec-
tion 11-62.11 of the Code also imposes an obligation on the con-
tractor to include these same payment and interest provisions in
its subcontracts, to ensure prompt payment of sub-subcontractors
providing labor or materials for the project.'9 An exception to the
seven-day payment requirement is permitted where the contractor
notifies the public body and the subcontractor of its intent to with-
hold payment and sets out the reason for this action. 20 Finally, sec-
tion 11-62.11 bars the contractor from recouping from the public
body any interest paid to the subcontractor as a result of the con-
tractor's failure to make payment within the statutory seven-day
period.2'
In 1991 the General Assembly added a new section at 11-56.2 of
the Virginia Public Procurement Act which protects the contrac-
tor's right to recover damages for delay caused by a public body.22
The section nullifies any provision in a public construction con-
tract that purports to waive or extinguish the contractor's right to
recover damages for unreasonable delay caused by acts or omis-
sions of the public body, its agents or employees. Section 11-56.2 of
the Code further includes a provision which discourages contrac-
tors from filing meritless or questionable delay claims. Under the
section, a contractor prosecuting a delay claim must pay a percent-
age of the costs incurred by the public body in investigating and
defending against the claim; the percentage being equal to that
portion of the contractor's original claim not proven at trial.23
Finally, the General Assembly amended section 11-4.1 of the
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-62.11 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
17. Id. § 11-62.11(1).
18. Id. § 11-62.11(2), (3).
19. Id. § 11-62.11(3).
20. Id. § 11-62.11(1)(b).
21. Id. § 11-62.11(3).
22. Id. § 11-56.2 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
23. Id.
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Code to bring public bodies within the section's scope.24 The
amendment renders unenforceable any construction contract pro-
vision that requires a contractor to indemnify and hold a public
body harmless for its negligence or that of its agents or
employees.25
C. Venue for Construction Contract Disputes
In 1991, the General Assembly amended section 8.01-581.015 of
the Code and added section 8.01-262.1.6 Pursuant to these amend-
ments, parties to a construction contract, without a mandatory ar-
bitration provision, may bring suit in the jurisdiction where the
work was to be performed, even if the contract contains a provision
establishing an exclusive forum elsewhere. These amendments, in
effect, nullify the forum selection clauses which some contractors
include in their contracts to neutralize the owner's perceived
"home court" advantage if litigation ensues. These amendments
also nullify any contract provision that fixes the location for
mandatory arbitration outside of the Commonwealth. Henceforth,
arbitration proceedings must likewise occur where the work was to
be performed, unless the parties agree to an alternative location in
Virginia.28
Finally, the venue amendments promulgated in 1991 apply only
to construction contracts entered into on or after July 1, 1991, and
only in the situation where the contractor or subcontractor in-
volved has its principal place of business in Virginia.2 9
D. Civil Actions Against the Virginia Department of
Transportation
In 1991, the General Assembly amended sections 33.1-19.1,
33.1-386, and 33.1-387 of the Code.30 These amendments permit a
contractor to bring a claim on behalf of its subcontractors and ma-
terialmen against the Virginia Department of Transportation
("VDOT") for costs and expenses incurred as a result of VDOT's
24. Compare id. § 11-4.1 (Repl. Vol. 1989) with id. § 11-4.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
25. Id. § 11-4.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
26. Id. §§ 8.01-581.015, -262.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
27. Id. § 8.01-262.1 (Cure. Supp. 1991).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. §§ 33.1-192.1, -386, -387 (Repl. Vol. 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1991).
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errors and omissions. The absence of privity of contract between
the affected subcontractors or materialmen and VDOT will no
longer bar these types of claims."1 These amendments will reverse
a recent Virginia Court of Appeals case holding to the contrary. s2
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Mechanic's Liens
The Supreme Court of Virginia decided four cases in the last
two years dealing with the validity and enforceability of
mechanic's liens - those creatures of statute that the courts in
Virginia strictly construe, often to the advantage of the landowner
and the neglect of the lien claimant.33 In Woodington Electric, Inc.
v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association,3 4 and Addington-Beaman
Lumber Co. v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Association,35 the court
declared invalid what it found to be impermissible "blanket"
mechanic's liens. In Mendenhall v. Cooper,6 the court struck
down a mechanic's lien because the claimant failed to add a "nec-
essary party." Finally, in McCoy v. Chrysler Condo Developers
Ltd. Partnership,3 7 the supreme court upheld a mechanic's lien
against an attack that it was untimely filed as a result of the land-
owner's bankruptcy. These cases reveal important lessons to attor-
neys practicing in the construction law area.
Woodington Electric actually involved three separate mechanic's
* lien suits. Common to all three suits was the fact that the claimant
had filed its lien against both the property it had improved and
other property unaffected by its work.' These cases presented the
Supreme Court of Virginia with its first opportunity to consider
whether a trial court had the power to excise from the lien that
property which should not have been included, while permitting
the claimant to proceed against the property correctly encum-
31. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33.1-192.1, -386, -387 (Repl. Vol. 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1991).
32. See APAC-Virginia, Inc. v. Virginia Dep't of Highways & Transp., 9 Va. App. 450, 388
S.E.2d 841 (1990) (discussed infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text).
33. See Rosser v. Cole, 237 Va. 572, 576, 379 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1989) (citing Clement v.
Adams Bros.-Payne Co., 113 Va. 547, 552, 75 S.E. 294, 296 (1912)) (where there is a question
of the existence and perfection of a mechanic's lien, the statutes involved are to be strictly
construed).
34. 238 Va. 623, 385 S.E.2d 872 (1989).
35. 241 Va. 436, 403 S.E.2d 688 (1991).
36. 239 Va. 71, 387 S.E.2d 468 (1990).
37. 239 Va. 321, 389 S.E.2d 905 (1990).
38. Woodington Electric, 238 Va. at 626-28, 385 S.E.2d at 873-74.
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bered.3 9 The court held that the trial court had no such power. The
supreme court observed that it is the duty of the claimant to prop-
erly place the lien only upon the property benefitted by the claim-
ant's work and no more. If the claimant files an "over-inclusive"
lien, the entire lien will be unenforceable.4 °
In the Addington-Beaman case the supreme court applied the
"blanket lien" concept to a situation where a material supplier
filed liens on multiple townhouse units contained within two build-
ings under construction.41 The claimant had supplied its materials
on an open account, but had not attempted to apportion its claim
among the separate townhouse units. On appeal the claimant un-
successfully asserted that, where materials are supplied on an open
account for an entire subdivision, the claimant need not allocate its
lien by separate lot or unit.42 The supreme court acknowledged
that a blanket lien is permissible where there is a single contract to
perform work on an entire project and there is no allocation of the
price among individual units.43 In this case, however, the court
found that the claimant had supplied materials which added value
to each of the individual townhouse units, as opposed to the whole
project. These values were determinable from work orders, in-
voices, and delivery documents. The court held that under these
circumstances apportionment of the lien should have occurred.
Thus, the claimant's lien was unenforceable.45
39. Id. at 629, 385 S.E.2d at 875.
40. Id. at 633-34, 385 S.E.2d at 877-78. The Woodington Electric court relied upon, but
went beyond, two of its prior decisions invalidating "blanket liens". See Rosser v. Cole, 237
Va. 572, 379 S.E.2d 323 (1989); United Masonry, Inc. v. Jefferson Mews, Inc., 218 Va. 360,
237 S.E.2d 171 (1977). Additionally, the court rejected the claimant's argument that § 43-15
of the Code permitted the trial court to disregard the over-inclusive scope of the lien. Wood-
ington Electric, 238 Va. at 638, 385 S.E.2d at 877. This section states that errors in property
description will not invalidate a mechanic's lien. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-15 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
The court ruled that an over-inclusive description is not an erroneous description under
that section. 238 Va. at 633, 385 S.E.2d at 877.
41. Addington-Beaman, 241 Va. at 437-38, 403 S.E.2d at 688-89.
42. Id. at 439, 403 S.E.2d at 689.
43. Id. at 440, 403 S.E.2d at 690 (citing Sergeant v. Denby, 87 Va. 206, 12 S.E. 402
(1890)); In re Thomas A. Cary, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 562
F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1977)).
44. Addington-Beaman, 241 Va. at 440, 403 S.E.2d at 690.
45. Id. Two Virginia circuit court cases were published after Woodington Electric and
before Addington-Beaman which applied a rationale similar to these cases to dismiss
mechanic's lien suits involving liens which were over-inclusive in scope. See Potomac Sav.
Bank v. Virginia Clay Prods., Inc., 19 Va. Cir. 109 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1990); Winder
Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Kanawha Trace Dev. Partners, 19 Va. Cir.
333 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990).
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The central issue in Mendenhall was whether a lien claimant
could amend its bill of complaint to add additional parties and
raise new claims not included in the original, after the statutory
six-month period had run.46 The claimant originally filed a
mechanic's lien against the condominium owner and the two own-
ers of the individual units that had been sold just prior to the rec-
ordation of the mechanic's lien memorandum. The claimant then
filed a bill of complaint against only the developer. After the devel-
oper went into bankruptcy, the claimant sought to amend the bill
of complaint to add the individual owners previously mentioned, as
well as the original lender and the lender's trustee.47
In Mendenhall, the supreme court first observed that a trial
court has no jurisdiction to proceed with a suit unless all "neces-
sary parties" have been added prior to the running of any applica-
ble statute of limitations.45 The supreme court then concluded that
the original lender, its trustee, and the two condominium unit
owners were, in fact, "necessary parties" to the mechanic's lien
suit, because the suit's outcome could adversely affect their prop-
erty interests.49 Relying on prior case law, the Mendenhall court
observed that the six-month statute of limitations for filing a suit
to enforce a mechanic's lien, as set out in section 43-17 of the
Code, continues to run on any new claim not brought in the origi-
nal pleading.50 Given that the lien claimant had not sued all "nec-
essary parties" within the required statutory period, the supreme
court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to proceed to
enforce the mechanic's lien. Consequently, the suit, as to all par-
ties, should have been dismissed.51
46. Mendenhall, 239 Va. at 72-73, 387 S.E.2d at 469-70. For the six-month statutory pe-
riod for filing the bill of complaint, see VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
47. Mendenhall, 239 Va. at 73-74, 387 S.E.2d at 469-70.
48. Id. at 74-75, 387 S.E.2d at 470 (citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 75, 387 S.E.2d at 471 (citing Neff v. Garrard, 216 Va. 496, 498, 219 S.E.2d 878,
879-90 (1975), and Commonwealth Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Standard Fed. Say &
Loan, 222 Va. 330, 331, 281 S.E.2d 811, 811 (1981)). Additional claims in the mechanic's lien
context do not relate back to the original filing for purposes of satisfying the six-month
limitation period in § 43-17 of the Code.
51. 239 Va. at 74-75, 387 S.E.2d at 471. In the wake of the Mendenhall decision, the
circuit courts in Virginia have dismissed a number of mechanic's lien suits upon a finding
that the claimant had not included a "necessary party" in either the memorandum of
mechanic's lien or the bill to enforce the lien. See, e.g., Bush Constr. Co. v. Patel, 21 Va. Cir.
353 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990) (dismissal where claimant did not add trustee and
beneficiary on deed of trust recorded after the filing of memorandum of mechanic's lien but
before the filing of bill of complaint); Harris v. CMANE Beaumeade, Ltd., 20 Va, Cir. 376
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The final case dealing with mechanics liens, decided by the su-
preme court in the last two years, is McCoy.5 2 This case addressed
the impact of the automatic stay under federal bankruptcy law on
the state law requirement that a lien claimant file its bill to enforce
a mechanic's lien within six months after the filing of the memo-
randum. In McCoy, an owner filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy peti-
tion after a plumbing contractor had filed a memorandum of
mechanic's lien against the owner's property.5 3 Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the petition automatically stayed the claimant's right
to file its bill to enforce the mechanic's lien."4 The claimant filed a
motion in the bankruptcy court seeking relief from the stay. In re-
sponse, the bankruptcy court "modified" the stay to permit the
claimant to file a bill of complaint in state court.
55
The claimant, then filed its bill of complaint in the appropriate
state court, over six months after the filing of the memorandum of
mechanic's lien, and some thirty-three days after the bankruptcy
court's order modifying the automatic stay. 6 The defendants
named in the bill filed motions to dismiss on the ground that the
suit was not brought within six months of the filing of the memo-
randum, pursuant to section 43-17 of the Code, as extended by sec-
tion 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 108(c) extends any
unexpired limitations period for 30 days after the bankruptcy
(County of Loudoun Cir. Ct. 1990) (dismissal where subcontractor did not add owner and
general contractor to enforcement suit even though the lien was bonded off before the filing
of suit); Imprecon Structures, Inc. v. BK Gen. Contractors, Inc., 20 Va. Cir. 240 (County of
Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1990) (dismissal where claimant in bill to enforce lien made mistake in
identifying owner; however, the dismissal was not required for failure to add the surety on
the bond filed to release the mechanic's lien, where the bond was filed after the suit was
brought); James River Bldg. Supply Co. v. Residential Innovation, Inc, 20 Va. Cir. 156
(County of Chesterfield Cir. Ct. 1990) (dismissal where claimant did not add parties that
acquired property after filing of memorandum of mechanic's lien but before filing of bill to
enforce); Winder Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Kanawha Trace Dev. Part-
ners, 19 Va. Cir. 333 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990) (dismissal where claimant failed to
name all owners of all lots affected by lien); Potomac Sav. Bank v. Virginia Clay Prod., Inc.,
19 Va. Cir. 109 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1990) (dismissal where claimant failed to name
all owners of all lots affected by lien). Hunt v. Eastbridge Elec., Inc., 20 Va. Cir. 43 (County
of Loudoun Cir. Ct. 1989) (dismissal where claimant did not add owner to enforcement suit
even though the lien was bonded off after the filing of suit).
52. 239 Va. 321, 389 S.E.2d 905 (1990).
53. Id. at 323, 389 S.E.2d at 906.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)(1988). Section 362(a)(1) bars the commencement of any action
against the debtor after a bankruptcy petition is filed. Id.
55. McCoy, 239 Va. at 323, 389 S.E.2d at 906. The bankruptcy court in McCoy also di-
rected that the claimant not serve the bill of complaint nor take any action on the pleading
without the prior approval of the bankruptcy court. Id.
56. Id.
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court has given notice' of the "termination or expiration" of the
automatic stay.57 The trial court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss. 8
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial court, holding
that the bill to enforce the mechanic's lien was timely filed. The
supreme court distinguished between "termination or expiration",
as used in section 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, and "modifica-
tion" of a stay order, which was what the bankruptcy court had
done in response to the claimant's motion.59
B. Statutes of Repose and Limitations Applicable to Construc-
tion Disputes
Over the last two years the Supreme Court of Virginia and the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit have decided several im-
portant cases involving the application and constitutionality of
Virginia's statute of repose.6 0 Section 8.01-250 of the Code essen-
tially bars an action against design professionals and contractors if
not brought within five years of the date services are last provided
on a construction project."'
The first case of importance addressed whether Virginia's stat-
ute of repose applied to claims brought by the Commonwealth. In
57. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)(1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
58. McCoy, 239 Va. at 323, 389 S.E.2d at 907.
59. Id. at 324, 389 S.E.2d at 907. While not addressing precisely the same point, two
Virginia circuit courts have recently decided cases similarly dealing with the timely filing of
mechanic's lien suits. In Viracon, Inc. v. Southeastern Glass & Door, 20 Va. Cir. 374 (County
of Chesterfield Cir. Ct. 1990), the court dismissed a mechanic's lien suit where the claimant
filed its bill of complaint within the requisite six-month period, but failed to pay the proper
filing fees at that time. The claimant supplemented the filing fees after the six-month pe-
riod had run upon receiving notice from the clerk's office. The court reasoned that the suit
was not properly filed until accompanied by adequate filing fees. Id. at 375.
In Calcourt Properties, Inc. v. Barnes Const. Co., 20 Va. Cir. 202 (County of Chesterfield
Cir. Ct. 1990), the court considered whether a lien claimant had timely filed a memorandum
of mechanic's lien within the ninety-day period set out in § 43-4 of the Code. The claimant
had not filed the lien within the statutory period if the time began to run from when it last
performed original work at the site. However, if the time began to run from when the claim-
ant returned to the site to perform repair work, the claimant had filed a timely lien. The
court acknowledged that the supreme court had not addressed what effect repair work has
on the timing requirements of § 43-4 of the Code. Nonetheless, the court ruled in favor of
the claimant based on a "general rule" recognized in other jurisdictions. Under this "general
rule", repair work will toll the statutory filing period if it is done in good faith, within a
reasonable time after completion of the previous work, pursuant to contract terms, and is
necessary to the finished job. 20 Va. Cir. at 203.
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
61. Id.
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Commonwealth v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,2 the supreme
court held, over a strong dissent, that section 8.01-250 of the Code
did in fact bar the Commonwealth's claims brought against suppli-
ers of asbestos building materials.63 The majority of the court dis-
tinguished between statutes of limitations, which at common law
do not run against the Commonwealth,64 and statutes of repose.
Statutes of limitation merely impose a time limitation on a party's
right to pursue the remedy associated with an accrued cause of ac-
tion.6 5 Statutes of repose, in contrast, fix a definite time in which a
suit must be brought, whether a cause of action has accrued or not,
after which the defendant is immune from liability for past acts. 66
In Owens-Corning, the majority, following earlier precedent,67
ruled that the expiration of the time period set out in a statute of
repose grants the defendant a substantive right to be free of fur-
ther liability, even from claims by the Commonwealth, which is
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution of
Virginia. 8
The Owens-Corning court found that application of the statute
of repose did not, under the facts of the case, cut off a cause of
action before "a right of action" had accrued.' Rather, it expressly
reserved for another day the question of the statute's constitution-
ality where it had such an effect.70 That day came in the next term
of court in the case of Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp.'1
In Hess, the plaintiffs were injured when a balcony collapsed in
an apartment complex built by the defendant contractor. The acci-
dent occurred slightly over five years after the defendant had com-
pleted all construction at the complex and a certificate of occu-
pancy had been issued. In response to the plaintiffs' suit, the
62. 238 Va. 595, 385 S.E.2d 865 (1989).
63. Id. at 602, 385 S.E.2d at 869.
64. Taylor & als' Case, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 780 (1878). The common law rule exempting the
sovereign from the running of statute of limitations is currently codified at § 8.01-231 of the
Code. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-231 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
65. Owens-Corning, 238 Va. at 598, 385 S.E.2d at 867.
66. Id. at 599, 385 S.E.2d at 867.
67. The court in Owens-Corning relied upon, and extended, its prior rulings in School Bd.
v. U.S. Gypsum, 234 Va. 32, 360 S.E.2d 325 (1987), and Roller v. Basic Constr. Co., 238 Va.
321, 384 S.E.2d 323 (1989). 238 Va. at 600, 385 S.E.2d at 868.
68. Owens-Corning, 238 Va. at 600-01, 385 S.E.2d at 868-69.
69. Id. at 602 n.5, 385 S.E.2d at 869 n.5.
70. Id.
71. 240 Va. 49, 392 S.E.2d 817 (1990).
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defendant raised the statute of repose by special plea.7 2 The plain-
tiffs in turn challenged the constitutionality of the statute, as it
applied to their case, on the ground that the statute violated the
due process7 s and equal protection7 4 clauses of the federal and
state constitutions.
The supreme court in Hess rejected both prongs of the plaintiffs'
constitutional attack on the statute of repose. The court observed
that the statute passed the applicable "rational basis" test for de-
termining whether a statute satisfies both due process and equal
protection.76 The court found that the legislature could legiti-
mately enact a statute cutting off liability for design professionals
and contractors, so as to preclude litigation long after "evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared. '77
The Hess court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the stat-
ute of repose violated due process in their case because its five-
year limitation had run before their causes of action had accrued.
The court found that only vested rights may not be disturbed by
legislative act.7 8 Since the plaintiffs' causes of action had not ac-
crued before the statute of repose had run, they had no vested
rights worthy of due process protection. 9
The final supreme court decision dealing with the statute of re-
pose considered the applicability of the "equipment or machinery"
72. Hess, 240 Va. at 51, 392 S.E.2d at 819.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The plaintiffs also claimed an equal protection right
under Virginia's constitution, but the supreme court disregarded that claim on the ground
that there is no expressed equal protection right in that document. 240 Va. at 55 n.4, 392
S.E.2d at 821 n.4.
75. Hess, 240 Va. at 54, 392 S.E.2d at 820-21.
76. Id. at 53, 392 S.E.2d at 820. The Hess court determined at the outset of its analysis
that no fundamental right or suspect classification was involved so as to trigger a "strict
scrutiny" constitutional test. Id. Instead, the court noted that the appropriate test of consti-
tutionality for both due process and equal protection in this case was whether the legisla-
ture has a "rational basis" for the statute. Id. at 53-55, 392 S.E.2d at 820-21.
77. Id. at 53, 392 S.E.2d at 820 (quoting Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 61 N.J. 190,
201, 293 A.2d 662, 667-68 (1972)).
78. Id. at 54, 392 S.E.2d at 821 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 1-16 (Repl. Vol. 1979); City of
Norfolk v. Kohler, 234 Va. 341, 345, 362 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1987); Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. 115,
120, 319 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1984)).
79. Id. at 54, 392 S.E.2d at 820-21. The Hess court distinguished the numerous cases from
other jurisdictions offered by plaintiffs in support of their constitutional argument. The
court found that these cases occurred in jurisdictions which, unlike Virginia, have constitu-
tional provisions guaranteeing the right to court access. Id.
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exception to the statute.8 0 In Eagles Court Condominium Unit
Owners Association v. Heatilator, Inc.,81 a condominium owners'
association brought suit against the manufacturer, supplier, and
installer of a steel fireplace system which was incorporated into
each of the condominium units during construction. Some nine
years after construction was complete the system failed, causing
fire damage to a number of the units. Thereafter, the plaintiffs
filed suit and all three defendants raised the statute of repose as a
defense by special plea.82
The supreme court partially affirmed and reversed the trial
court's decision in Eagles Court. It affirmed the ruling that the
statute clearly barred the association's claim against the installer
of the fireplace system. 3 The court, however, reversed the lower
court's ruling dismissing the claims against the manufacturer and
supplier. In ruling against the manufacturer and supplier, the
lower court had relied upon the general statute of limitations in
former section 8.24 of the Code,84 and the case law interpreting it,
to hold that the statute of limitations applicable to the manufac-
turer and supplier ran five years after the installations were
completed.85
Contrary to the trial court, the supreme court held that the spe-
cific language in the second sentence of the statute of repose super-
seded the general language in, and judicial interpretation of, for-
80. The equipment/machinery exception is found in the second paragraph of § 8.01-250 of
the Code, which states, in pertinent part, that the statute does not apply "[to the manufac-
turer or supplier of any equipment or machinery or other articles installed in a structure
upon real property. . .; rather each such action shall be brought within the time next after
such injury occurs as provided in §§ 8.01-243 and 8.01-246." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (Repl.
Vol. 1984).
81. 239 Va. 325, 389 S.E.2d 304 (1990).
82. Id. at 327, 389 S.E.2d at 305.
83. Id. at 329, 389 S.E.2d at 306. The supreme court in Eagles Court further held that the
trial court correctly dismissed the allegations of negligent design of the fireplace system.
The first sentence of the statute of repose, the court noted, expressly confers the statute's
protection on those involved in design or construction of improvements to real property. Id.
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (repealed 1977). Former § 8-24 of the Code
stated, in pertinent part, that "[e]very personal action, for which no limitation is otherwise
prescribed, shall be brought within five years after the right to bring the same shall have
accrued ... ." Id.
85. Eagles Court, 239 Va. at 329-30, 389 S.E.2d at 306-07. The trial court in Eagles Court
had concluded that the association's cause of action accrued under § 8-24 of the Code upon
the completion of installation, based on its reading of Virginia Military Inst. v. King, 217
Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977), and Housing Auth. v. Laburnum Corp., 195 Va. 827, 80
S.E.2d 574 (1954). 239 Va. at 329, 389 S.E.2d at 306.
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mer section 8.24 of the Code.8 6 The governing language in section
8.01-250 mandates that an action against a manufacturer and sup-
plier be brought within the applicable limitations periods for per-
sonal injury and property damage claims after the injury occurs.8 "
Thus, the supreme court reasoned that if the fireplace system was
"machinery or equipment" under the exception to section 8.01-250
of the Code, the association possessed a timely claim against the
manufacturer and supplier of that system.8
The supreme court then remanded the case to the trial court for
a factual determination of whether the fireplace system was "ma-
chinery or equipment" or "ordinary building materials."8 The
court's decision to remand was based on its ruling in a prior case,
where it held that suppliers of ordinary building materials are pro-
tected by the statute of repose.90
The very issue remanded in Eagles Court was decided by the
Fourth Circuit in City of Richmond v. Madison Management
Group.1 In Madison Management, the City of Richmond sued nu-
merous parties to recover damages related to the use of defective
concrete pipe in construction of the city's water transmission line.
Among the parties sued was the pipe's manufacturer, which the
city sued both for fraud and breach of contract. In response, the
manufacturer claimed that the fraud count was barred by Vir-
ginia's statute of repose because the suit was not brought within
five years of completion of construction.92
The Fourth Circuit in Madison Management ruled against the
manufacturer on the statute of repose issue. Applying the rules es-
tablished in Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co.,93
the Fourth Circuit held that the concrete pipe was "equipment"
86. Eagles Court, 239 Va. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 306-07.
87. See supra note 80.
88. 239 Va. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 306-07.
89. Id. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 307.
90. See Cape Henry Towers v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 331 S.E.2d 476 (1985).
91. 918 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1990).
92. Id. at 442-45. The Fourth Circuit in Madison Management does not explain why the
manufacturer did not raise the statute of repose to the contract claim. Possibly that issue
was not pressed because an earlier Fourth Circuit decision suggested that Virginia's statute
of repose does not apply to contract claims, but rather to tort claims for injury to person or
property. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 722 F.2d 1160 (4th
Cir. 1983); accord Delon Hampton & Assocs., Chartered, Environdyne Eng., Inc. v. Wash-
ington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 90-2047 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 1991) (Lexis 1991 U.S. App.
17765).
93. 229 Va. 596, 331 S.E.2d 476 (1985).
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within the exception to the statute of repose, as opposed to ordi-
nary building products. Because the exception to the statute of re-
pose applied, and the city had filed suit soon after injury occurred,
the suit was deemed timely filed.94 Among the factors that the
Fourth Circuit emphasized in concluding that the concrete pipe
constituted "equipment" were: (1) that the pipe was technically so-
phisticated and subject to quality control at the factory; (2) that
the pipe carried independent manufacturer warranties that could
be voided if the pipe was not installed according to the manufac-
turer's instructions; and (3) that the manufacturer had collabo-
rated with the city's engineers and the contractor in the design and
development of shop drawings and schedules . 5
The final Virginia case applying the statute of limitations to a
construction dispute is W.E. Brown, Inc. v. Pederson Construction
& Tile Co. 96 In Brown, a Virginia circuit court considered which
statute of limitations should apply to a plumbing subcontractor's
claim for payment against its general contractor - the three-year
statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts97 or the four-year
statute of limitations applicable to the sale of goods.98 Finding no
controlling authority by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the circuit
court in Brown ruled that the four-year statute controlled because
the value of the equipment furnished under the contract greatly
exceeded the labor costs.99
C. Surety Disputes
The general rule in Virginia regarding surety disputes has long
been that compensated sureties providing bonds for construction
contracts are obligated to pay upon the default of their principals,
unless there has been a "material variation" in the bonded obliga-
tion.100 Recently, the supreme court reaffirmed that general rule
when it reversed a trial court's decision in favor of a surety. In
Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Southern Cross Coal
94. Madison Management, 918 F.2d at 444-45.
95. Id. at 445.
96. 20 Va. Cir. 280 (City of Charlottesville Cir. Ct. 1990).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
98. Id. § 8.2-725 (Added Vol. 1965).
99. Brown, 20 Va. Cir. at 282-83 (applying the test set out in Coakley & Williams, Inc. v.
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986)).
100. Southwood Builders, Inc. v. Peerless Ins., 235 Va. 164, 168-69, 366 S.E.2d 104, 107
(1988); C.S. Luck & Sons v. Boatwright, 157 Va. 490, 494-95, 162 S.E. 53, 54 (1932).
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Corp.,1°1 the court found that the surety in question had failed to
prove at trial the requisite "material variation" to vitiate the
surety's obligation under the bond.'0 2
The surety in Southern Cross provided a bond to a contractor
who was to build subdivision roads for the county. After the con-
tractor's default, the county hired another contractor who com-
pleted the work in a manner inconsistent with the original plans.103
The surety relied upon this inconsistency as proof of a material
variation sufficient to void its obligation. The supreme court, how-
ever, found that the evidence demonstrated that the county had
selected the most cost-effective method of curing the contractor's
default. The court observed that the burden of proof was on the
surety to show material variation, and that the surety had failed to
meet this burden.10 4
The surety in Charles H. Tompkins Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co.'05 was more successful in showing a material varia-
tion of the bonded obligation. In Tompkins, the surety provided a
bid bond to a subcontractor who was subsequently awarded the
subcontract and had begun performance. Over a year later, the
subcontractor defaulted and the general contractor sued on the bid
bond. 06 In ruling in favor of the surety, the trial court easily found
a material variation of the bid bond obligation. The court noted
that the general contractor had not required the subcontractor to
procure a performance bond prior to beginning work, even though
it was an express obligation of the bid bond. Thus, the court found
that the general contractor's acquiescence in the subcontractor's
unsecured performance was a material alteration of the surety's
bid bond obligation. 10 7
The Tompkins court also rejected the general contractor's argu-
ment that the surety's issuance of the bid bond obligated it to is-
sue a performance and payment bond if the subcontractor received
the subcontract. The court noted that the bid bond clearly obli-
101. 238 Va. 91, 380 S.E.2d 636 (1989).
102. Southern Cross, 238 Va. at 95, 380 S.E.2d at 639.
103. Id. at 94-95, 380 S.E.2d at 638.
104. Id. at 95-96, 380 S.E.2d at 638-39. The surety in Southern Cross 'did not present any
evidence of its own. Instead, the surety relied on the county's evidence and on the evidence
of its defaulted principal, which was also a party to the suit. Id. at 94-95, 380 S.E.2d at 638-
39.
105. 732 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1990).
106. Id. at 1371-72.
107. Id. at 1377.
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gated the surety only until such time as the subcontractor entered
its subcontract with the contractor and gave a performance
bond.108 Moreover, the court observed that the subcontractor had
executed a standard indemnity agreement with the surety; which
expressly stated that the surety was under no obligation to issue
any bond prospectively as a result of having previously issued any
bonds."0 9
Finally, the Tompkins court rejected the general contractor's ar-
gument that, based on trade custom and usage, an implied con-
tract existed between the subcontractor and the bid bond surety,
whereby the surety was obligated to issue performance and pay-
ment bonds. 110 The court reasoned that, under Virginia law, trade
and usage evidence is only permissible to clarify a contract term,
not to create a contract right - such as the one sought by the
general contractor in Tompkins.' Furthermore, the Tompkins
court added that public policy considerations mitigated against
finding that a bid bond surety was subject to an implied contract
obligation to enter into a separate performance and payment bond
after the award of the contract." 2 The Court reasoned that the
principal risk associated with the bid bond is the payment of the
difference between the subcontractor's bid and the next highest
bid, should there be a default. On the contrary, the risk associated
with the performance and payment bond would be much higher.
Thus, a surety should be able to consider such risk at the time the
contract is awarded."'
The supreme court in Board of Supervisors v. Sentry Insurance
Co.'" addressed the issue of whether a performance bond con-
tained an enforceable contractual limitations period, which could
be used to bar a claim on the bond by the owner/obligee after the
principal/contractor defaulted. In Sentry, the owner brought suit
108. Id. at 1372.
109. Id. The Tompkins court cited cases from numerous jurisdictions construing similar
language as found in the indemnity agreement at issue in Tompkins, which absolved the
surety of any obligation to provide a performance bond subsequent to a bid bond. Id.
110. Id. at 1375-76.
111. Id. at 1375 (citing Charles Syer & Co. v. Lester, 116 Va. 541, 82 S.E. 122 (1914)).
112. Id. at 1375-76.
113. Id. Among the factors the Tompkins court listed that could affect the surety's deci-
sion to provide a performance and payment bond is the difference between the principal's
bid and the next highest bid, which might suggest the principal is seriously underbidding
the project or has made a serious bid miscalculation. Id. at 1376.
114. 239 Va. 622, 391 S.E.2d 273 (1990).
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against the surety ten months after the principal's default. 15 As a
defense, the surety relied on the language in the bond specifying
that the owner may bring suit within six months after default, sub-
ject to a tolling provision, should the surety elect to perform the
principal's obligations. The paragraph in question also specified
that, in the event the owner brought suit, its damages would be
limited to costs incurred before the latter of 18 months after suit
was filed, or 24 months after default."' i
The supreme court held that the bond did not contain the "clear
language" necessary to establish a mandatory contractual limita-
tions period. 1 7 The Sentry court contrasted language in the bond
with language at issue in other cases where it had enforced clear
mandatory limitation terms.' Thus, in future adherence to Sen-
try, any ambiguity as to contractually established time limits for
filing suit will be interpreted as discretionary in nature.
Subsequent to Sentry, the supreme court again addressed the
contractual limitations issue in the case of Commercial Construc-
tion Specialties, Inc. v. ACM Construction Management Corp.'
In ACM a subcontractor on a public construction project brought
suit on the contractor's payment bond for materials supplied on
the project for which it had not been paid.' The payment bond
contained a provision barring any claim brought more than ninety
days after the subcontractor last performed work or provided
materials. 121 The subcontractor did not bring suit within this
ninety-day period, and the surety and the general contractor filed
demurrers to the claim based on the bond's limitation period. 2 '
The supreme court in ACM reversed the trial court's ruling sus-
taining the demurrers. 2 ' The court held that since the subcontrac-
115. Id. at 624, 391 S.E.2d at 274.
116. Sentry, 239 Va. at 625, 391 S.E.2d at 274.
117. Id. at 626, 391 S.E.2d at 275-76. In rejecting the surety's argument in Sentry, the
supreme court also relied on several other paragraphs in the bond which revealed an in-
tended flexibility of enforcement should default occur. The court found such contractual
evidence of flexibility inconsistent with the surety's argument that the six-month reference
to bringing suit was mandatory in nature. Id. at 627, 391 S.E.2d at 276.
118. Id. at 626, 391 S.E.2d at 275 (citing Southwood Builders, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co.,
235 Va. 164, 366 S.E.2d 104 (1988); Board of Supervisors v. Sampson, 235 Va. 516, 369
S.E.2d 178 (1988)).
119. 242 Va. 102, 405 S.E.2d 852 (1991).
120. Id. at 103-104, 405 S.E.2d at 852-53.
121. Id. at 104, 405 S.E.2d at 853.
122. Id. at 104, 405 S.E.2d at 853.
123. Id. at 105-106, 405 S.E.2d at 853-54.
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tor was not a party to the payment bonds it was not bound by its
limitations, particularly when those limitations varied from the
180-day limitation period provided by statute. 124 The court also re-
jected the defendants' contention that the subcontractor had con-
structive knowledge of the shorter period, and thus had consented
to it, by virtue of the fact that the bond had been filed with the
public owner pursuant to statute. 125 The supreme court reasoned
that general contractors and their sureties should not be permitted
to negate statutes specifically designed to protect subcontractors
and materialmen who cannot file mechanic's liens against public
property to protect their interests. 126
The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond has also recently de-
cided a surety case dealing with several interesting payment bond
issues. Starr Electric Co. v. Federal Insurance Co.1 27 concerned a
building that was destroyed by fire just prior to the completion of
construction. A subcontractor on the project, who had insurance
covering its work, filed a claim with its insurance company. The
subcontractor sought to recover the value of its work, for which it
had not yet received payment from the general contractor. The in-
surance company paid the subcontractor and then sued the general
contractor's payment and performance bond surety to collect the
money owed to the subcontractor at the time of the fire.128
In response, the surety raised four defenses to the payment
claim. First, the surety contended that the destruction of the
building prior to completion of the work rendered the subcontrac-
tor's contract impossible to perform, excusing the general contrac-
tor from its obligation to make payment under the contract. 29 The
circuit court rejected this argument. The court distinguished the
obligation of the general contractor to provide a finished building,
despite fire loss, from the subcontractor's obligation to perform
work, which is excused upon destruction of the project. The court
124. Id. at 106, 405 S.E.2d at 854. Section 11-60 of the Code, upon which the ACM Court
relied, provides that a subcontractor who is not in privity of contract with the contractor
providing a payment bond for a public project may bring an action on the bond, if the
subcontractor has given notice of the claim to the contractor within 180 days after last per-
forming services or providing materials. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-60 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
125. ACM, 242 Va. at 106, 405 S.E.2d at 854. Section 11-58(D) of the Code requires
surety bonds on public projects to be filed with the public body which awarded the contract.
VA. CODE ANN. § 11-58(D) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
126. ACM, 242 Va. at 106.
127. 20 Va. Cir. 405 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990).
128. Id. at 405-06.
129. Id. at 406.
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concluded that Virginia law gave the subcontractor a right to re-
ceive payment for the value of the destroyed work.130
Second, the surety in Starr contended that a provision in the
subcontract provided that the subcontractor would indemnify the
general contractor against claims by third parties, barring the sub-
rogation claim by the subcontractor's insurer.' 31 The circuit court
rejected this argument as well, finding that the insurer's claim was
not a third-party claim that would trigger the indemnity right, but
rather was the subcontractor's own claim for payment under the
contract. 32 The indemnity clause, therefore, did not apply.
Third, the surety contended that the definition of "work" in the
contractor's general conditions, which the subcontractor's contract
incorporated by reference, precluded the subcontractor from suing
for payment before the "completed construction" of the project.133
The circuit court found that the definition of work was ambiguous,
and thus must be resolved in favor of the subcontractor and its
subrogee. Moreover, the court cited language elsewhere in the gen-
eral conditions that suggested that "work" was to be interpreted as
work done to a particular point in time and not to the final com-
pletion of the project. 34
Finally, the surety contended that the subcontractor had waived
any right to recover from the general contractor as a result of the
waiver provision in the general conditions. This provision required
the subcontractor to waive any claim for damages caused by fire to
the extent of insurance coverage. 3 The court rejected this argu-
ment on the ground that the claim at issue was not for fire loss,
but rather it was for payment due under the contract. To the same
extent, the court rejected the surety's contention that, as co-in-
sureds, both the contractor and subcontractor were immune from
subrogatiori actions. The court again observed that the claim sued
upon was one of payment under the contract and not for recovery
130. Starr, 20 Va. Cir. at 406-07 (citing Atlantic and Danville Ry. Co. v. Delaware Constr.
Co., 98 Va. 503, 37 S.E. 13 (1900); Ricks v. Sumler, 179 Va. 571, 19 S.E.2d 889 (1942); and
Fowler v. Insurance Co. of Am., 155 Ga. App. 439, 270 S.E.2d 845 (1980)).
131. Starr, 20 Va. Cir. at 407-08.
132. Id. at 408.
133. Id. at 408. While the circuit court in Starr does not specify the source of the general
conditions at issue, the quotations referred to by the court suggest that the general condi-
tions were those published by the American Institute of Architects, Form A-201 (1987).
134. Id. at 409.
135. Id.
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of insurance proceeds paid to a co-insured.13 6 Having rejected all of
the surety's arguments, the court ruled in favor of the subcontrac-
tor's insurer."3 '
D. Contract Disputes Between Owners and Contractors or Con-
tractors and Subcontractors
The Virginia courts have recently decided a number of cases
where owners, contractors, or subcontractors were at odds on is-
sues involving the interpretation of contractual rights. In Clevert v.
Jeff W. Soden, Inc., 3s for example, the question before the court
was whether defective performance under a construction contract,
as opposed to nonperformance, gave rise to a contractual right to
recover attorney's fees, where the contract permitted such recovery
only in the event of "default."113 The contractor successfully ar-
gued to the trial court that a breach of contract was not a "de-
fault" under the contract. The supreme court disagreed, however,
holding that the ordinary and applicable meaning of "default" en-
compassed defective performance. Therefore, it ruled that attor-
ney's fees were recoverable. 1
40
The. issue in John Grier Construction Co. v. Jones Welding &
Repair, Inc.14 1 was whether a subcontractor who unknowingly
cashed a payment check from its contractor having the words
"payment in full" on the back was barred by the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction from recovering additional money claimed.' 42 The
supreme court held that, given the subcontractor's lack of knowl-
edge as to the "payment in full" language, there had not been the
necessary meeting of the minds to support an accord and
satisfaction.143
The John Grier decision is particularly interesting because the
supreme court rejected the defendant's credible argument that sec-
136. Id.
137. Starr, 20 Va. Cir. at 410. The Starr court did agree with one defense asserted by the
surety - that the subcontractor's subrogee had no right to sue on the performance bond.
The court, however, found that the subrogee did have standing to recover on the payment
bond for the full amount of its claim. Id.
138. 241 Va. 108, 400 S.E.2d 181 (1991).
139. Id. at 109, 400 S.E.2d at 182.
140. Id. at 110-12, 400 S.E.2d at 184.
141. 238 Va. 270, 383 S.E.2d 719 (1989).
142. Id. at 272, 383 S.E.2d at 720.
143. Id. (relying on Virginia-Carolina Elec. Works v. Cooper, 192 Va. 78, 81, 63 S.E.2d
717, 719 (1951)).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tion 8.1-207 of Virginia's Commercial Code144 supplanted the com-
mon law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. The defendant argued
that section 8.1-207 now provided the sole statutory method by
which "payment in full" checks could be negotiated without
forfeiting the right to sue for any deficit. Under that section, the
payee may negotiate the check and still preserve its rights to sue
for a deficiency, if the payee uses such words as "under protest"
when endorsing the check.145 The supreme court acknowledged
that a minority of courts in other jurisdictions have held that pas-
sage of a section identical to section 8.1-207 of the Code reversed
the common law rules on accord and satisfaction, and therefore
provided the only method by which a party to a contract preserved
a deficiency claim. The Court, however, elected to follow the ma-
jority rule that preserves the common law doctrine.146
The supreme court's ruling in John Grier left unanswered the
question of whether a payee of a "full payment" check can ever
endorse the check as a partial payment of the payee's claim. The
common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction would suggest that
if the payee knows of the "full payment" language, he negotiates
the check at his own risk. Section 8.1-207, however, would have at
least provided the payee a method to cash the check and sue for
the deficiency. Yet, under the common law rules, the more prudent
response for a payee who notices the "full payment" language may
be to return the check and sue for the full amount.
Another recent case decided by the supreme court dealing with
the rights of contracting parties to pursue their claims is Piland
Corp. v. League Construction Co.' 47 In Piland, a subcontractor
who provided labor and materials for two separate projects
brought suit against the general contractor for unpaid retainage on
one of the projects. The general contractor admitted holding the
retainage and further admitted that the work was satisfactory. Yet,
the general contractor affirmatively claimed a right to set off cer-
tain back charges and delay claims against the subcontractor's
claim. The general contractor also filed a counterclaim for faulty
work done at the second project and moved for a stay pending ar-
bitration, as called for in the contract.148
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-207 (Added Vol. 1965).
145. John Grier, 238 Va. at 273, 383 S.E.2d at 721.
146. Id. at 273-74, 383 S.E.2d at 721-22.
147. 238 Va. 187, 380 S.E.2d 652 (1989).
148. Id. at 189, 380 S.E.2d at 652-53.
[Vol. 25:699720
1991] CONSTRUCTION LAW
The trial court in Piland granted summary judgment to the sub-
contractor on its liquidated claim, denied the stay for arbitration,
and denied the general contractor's right of set off of its unliqui-
dated claim against the subcontractor's liquidated claim.149 The
supreme court reversed, finding that summary judgment was im-
proper on the subcontractor's claim, given the dispute as to back
charges and delay claims.150 Moreover, the court found that the
general contractor should be permitted to arbitrate those claims, as
well as its unliquidated counterclaim for faulty workmanship on
the second project, as valid set-offs against the subcontractor's liq-
uidated claim. 151
In APAC-Virginia, Inc. v. Virginia Department of Highways &
Transportation,152 the Court of Appeals of Virginia resolved the
question of whether a general contractor could pursue a delay
claim against a state agency on behalf of its subcontractor. The
court ruled that the general contractor could not pursue the sub-
contractor's claim, given that the subcontractor's claim was one of
economic loss and the subcontractor was not in privity with the
agency.153
Two recent circuit court cases dealing with contract matters of
some importance are Davis v. Hayden 1 5  and Colonial Mechanical
149. Piland, 238 Va. at 189, 380 S.E.2d at 653.
150. Id. at 190, 380 S.E.2d at 653.
151. Id. at 190-91, 380 S.E.2d at 653-54. The Piland court relied upon Rule 3:8 of the
Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia as authority that an unliquidated debt may be set off
against a liquidated debt. That rule provides the basis for a defendant to file a counterclaim
at law against the plaintiff "whether or not it is for liquidated damages. . . ." VA. Sup. CT.
R. 3:8.
152. 9 Va. App. 450, 388 S.E.2d 841 (1990).
153. Id. at 452, 388 S.E.2d at 842 (relying on the economic loss ruling in Copenhaver v.
Rogers, 238 Va. 361, 366, 384 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1989)). The APAC court rejected the general
contractor's additional argument that § 33.1-192.1 of the Code authorized a general contrac-
tor to pursue a pass-through claim for persons "claiming under" the contractor. The court
interpreted that section to be a statute of limitations requiring a contractor to pursue an
administrative remedy before filing suit. Further, the court construed the phrase "claiming
under" to mean successors in interest and not lower tier subcontractors. 9 Va. App. at 453,
388 S.E.2d at 843.
In contrast to the APAC holding, a circuit court in Virginia previously had held that a
general contractor may prosecute a pass-through claim against the owner on behalf of its
subcontractor. See George Hyman Const. Co. v. McLean Hotel Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 21
Va. Cir. 544, 546 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1988).
In 1991, the General Assembly reversed the holding in APAC as to claims brought against
VDOT. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. The "economic loss" rule established
in APAC, however, is broadly stated and will undoubtedly provide a basis for blocking "pass
through" claims against owners other than VDOT in future cases.
154, 20 Va. Cir. 250 (County of Smyth Cir. Ct. 1990).
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Corp. v. Jesson & Frantz Constructors and Developers.155 In Davis
the court ruled that a home buyer cannot recover money paid to an
unlicensed contractor where there is no allegation of faulty work-
manship. 15 In a case of first impression in Virginia, the court in
Colonial Mechanical ruled that the typical "paid when paid"
clause found in many subcontracts did not excuse the general con-
tractor from making final payment to the subcontractor when the
owner went bankrupt without first paying the general
contractor. 5 '
The Colonial Mechanical decision will surprise Virginia contrac-
tors who have undoubtedly read their "paid when paid" clauses
literally. Contractors who wish to ensure that their payment obli-
gation to their subcontractors is contingent on prior receipt of pay-
ment from the owner will now need to use much clearer language
to avoid the precedent established by Colonial Mechanical.'
E. Recent Tort Cases Involving Contractors or Builders
In MacCoy v. Colony House Builders,15 9 the Supreme Court of
Virginia considered whether a home builder, who had contracted
orally with an electrician to wire a residence under construction,
was liable for fire damage to the residence caused by the electri-
cian's failure to comply with the building code. 60 The court ruled
that the home builder was not liable in tort for the negligent acts
155. Case No. LS-2979-2 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct., Dec. 14, 1990), reprinted in 3 J. Civ.
LITIGATION 66 (1991) [hereinafter Civ. LITIGATION].
156. Davis, 20 Va. Cir. at 253-54.
157. See Civ. LITIGATION, supra note 155, at 70-72. The "paid when paid" clause in Colo-
nial Mechanical read as follows: "The [c]ontractor shall make final payment to the
[s]ubcontractor within ten days of receipt of final payment from the owner." Id. at 66. The
circuit court refused to read this clause literally; rather, the court interpreted the clause as
merely imposing a duty on the general contractor to make payment within a "reasonable
time" after the subcontractor completes the work associated with the payment. Id. at 67
(following Thomas J. Dyer Co. v. Bishop Int'l Eng'g Co., 303 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1962)).
158. Attorneys representing contractors who want to ensure that payment from the owner
is a condition precedent to the contractor's payment obligation to the subcontractor may
want to consider the case of Crown Plastering Corp. v. Elite Assocs. Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 694
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990). In that case the court enforced a "paid when paid" clause which read
as follows "[rieceipt of payment from the owner for the subcontractor's work is a condition
precedent to payment by the contractor to the subcontractor. The [s]ubcontractor hereby
acknowledges that it relies on the credit of the [o]wner, not the [c]ontractor, for payment of
its work." Id. at 695. Such a clause makes very clear that the subcontractor has agreed that
payment from the owner is a condition precedent to any payment from the contractor to the
subcontractor.
159. 239 Va. 64, 387 S.E.2d 760 (1990).
160. Id. at 65-66, 387 S.E.2d. at 760-61.
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of the electrician. 161
The MacCoy court first found that the trial record established
that the electrician was an independent contractor and not an em-
ployee of the builder, for whom the builder would have been liable
on the theory of respondeat superior. The court noted that none of
the usual indicators of an employment relationship were present -
such as the existence of W-2 forms, the withholding of payroll
taxes, or the payment of insurance and other benefits.1' 2 Further,
the builder did not control the "methods and means" by which the
electrician performed his services. 6 3
The MacCoy court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
builder owed the plaintiffs a non-delegable duty to ensure that its
independent contractor's work complied with the building code.16 4
The court ruled that, while violation of the building code was neg-
ligence per se, the builder breached no duty to the plaintiffs in
relying on its independent contractor to perform the work in a law-
ful manner.16 5
In R.B. Hazard, Inc. v. Panco,6 6 the principal issue was whether
a contractor, who was sued for negligence on a federal construction
project, could avoid tort liability by invoking the "federal contrac-
tor" defense. That defense protects a contractor, who performs
work consistent with the owner's design, from liability for the work
performed. 67 In Hazard, the contractor asserted the defense rela-
tive to its installation of a large entrance gate at a military installa-
tion in Virginia. The gate had fallen on two occasions on the same
day some months after construction was completed, injuring the
plaintiff on the second fall. 6 8
161. Id. at 68-70, 387 S.E.2d at 763.
162. MacCoy, 239 Va. at 66, 387 S.E.2d at 761-62.
163. Id. at 67-69, 387 S.E.2d at 761-62. The court in MacCoy concluded that the builder's
presence at the site, instructions to the electrician as to the location of wiring fixtures,
purchase of electrical materials, and scheduling of the work did not amount to control of the
means and methods of the work so as to render the electrician the builder's employee. Id.
164. Id. at 69-70, 387 S.E.2d at 762-63.
165. Id. The court in MacCoy refused to apply the "wrongful per se" exception to the
general rule that a party is not liable for the negligent acts of an independent contractor.
According to the court, this exception only applies when the work to be performed is unlaw-
ful, and not when the work to be performed is lawful, but the manner of performance is
unlawful. Id. at 70, 387 S.E.2d at 763 (following Emmerson v. Fay, 94 Va. 60, 26 S.E. 386
(1896)).
166. 240 Va. 438, 397 S.E.2d 866 (1990).
167. Id. at 441, 397 S.E.2d at 867-68.
168. Id. at 440-41, 397 S.E.2d at 867.
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The jury in Hazard ruled against the defendant, rejecting the
federal contractor's defense on the facts presented. The supreme
court affirmed the jury verdict, finding that the contractor had not
proven sufficient facts at trial to establish the federal contractor
defense as a matter of law. The court noted that evidence was
presented to show that the installation of the gate did not comply
with the plans, and that the gate's failure was the result of the
contractor's poor workmanship.16 9
The contractor in Hazard also challenged the jury verdict of lia-
bility on proximate cause grounds. The contractor argued that the
intervening cause of the accident was the replacement of the gate
in an upright position after it fell earlier in the day; this interven-
ing event being the proximate cause of the accident. 7 0 The su-
preme court rejected this argument as well. It found that not only
was the gate's original failure reasonably foreseeable, given the de-
fects in construction; but also that it was reasonably foreseeable
that someone would replace the gate after its initial failure, creat-
ing a situation where it would fall again. Thus, the contractor's
original negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.' 7'
In City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group,7 2 a case
discussed earlier in the statute of repose section of this article, 17 3
the Fourth Circuit resolved an issue of first impression under Vir-
ginia law. The issue was whether a plaintiff can recover economic
loss damages in a tort action, when the tort alleged is fraud. 7 4 The
city's fraud count was based on the allegation that the defendant
pipe manufacturer knew, when it promised to supply pipe for the
city's water line, that the pipe was defective and would fail. 7 5
169. Hazard, 240 Va. at 442-43, 397 S.E.2d at 868-69.
170. Id. at 443-44, 397 S.E.2d at 869.
171. Id. at 444, 397 S.E.2d at 869.
172. 918 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1990).
173. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
174. Madison Management, 918 F.2d at 445-47. The Supreme Court of Virginia has de-
fined economic loss damages as:
[D]amages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of defective product,
or consequent loss of profits - without any claim of personal injury or damage to
other property ... as well as the diminution in the value of the product because it is
inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manu-
factured and sold.
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419, 423 n.3, 374 S.E.2d 55,
57 n.3 (1988) (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 82, 435 N.E.2d
443, 449 (1982)).
175. Madison Management, 918 F.2d at 447.
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The manufacturer in Madison Management argued that recent
case law in Virginia established that damages for economic loss are
not recoverable in tort actions; such damages are only recoverable
where the defendant breaches contractual duties owed to the
plaintiff.17 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, however, holding that
economic loss damages are recoverable in a fraud action. The court
reasoned that Virginia law recognizes a tort-based duty not to en-
gage in fraud, which exists independent of contract. Breach of this
independent duty provided the basis for recovery of economic
losses apart from any contractual remedies that might or might not
otherwise exist.177
F. Workers' Compensation Cases Arising Out of Construction
By its very nature, a construction project brings numerous par-
ties together on a potentially dangerous site, including representa-
tives of the owner and the public, as well as employees of the ar-
chitect, the contractor, and numerous subcontractors and
materialmen. When an injury occurs, the capacity of the injured
person to sue the negligent parties at common law is governed by
the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act.178 This Act gives the in-
jured employee a right to recover statutory benefits from his em-
ployer, but bars an action against the employer at common law.
79
Virginia courts have repeatedly been required to determine the
scope of the workers' compensation bar to common law suits. The
supreme court has recently decided two such cases involving archi-
tects where the scope of the Act was at issue.
In Evans v. Hook, 80 the supreme court considered whether an
injured employee of a general contractor on a construction project
could bring a tort action against the project's architect, a solo prac-
176. Id. at 445-46 (relying upon the recent case of Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale,
Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419, 374 S.E.2d 55 (1988)). In Sensenbrenner, the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that a home owner could not sue in negligence an architect for a defective
swimming pool, where the owner was not in privity of contract with the architect. 236 Va.
419, 425, 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (1988). The Sensenbrenner court ruled that economic loss dam-
ages are contractual in nature and that recovery of them should be reserved to situations
where privity of contract exists between the parties. Id.; see also Rotonda Condominium
Owners Assoc. v. Rotonda Assocs., 238 Va. 85, 90, 380 S.E.2d 876, 879 (1989)("[E]conomic
losses are not recoverable in tort; they are purely the result of disappointed economic expec-
tations. The law of contracts provides the sole redress for such claims.").
177. Madison Management, 918 F.2d at 446-47.
178. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-1 to -163 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1991).
179. Id. § 65.1-40 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
180. 239 Va. 127, 387 S.E.2d 777 (1990).
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titioner without any employees, working for the project's devel-
oper.' 8 ' The supreme court held that the employee was barred by
the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act from maintaining his suit
against the architect. 18 2
The court observed that section 65.1-29 of the Code and related
provisions of the Act had been previously interpreted to confer the
status of "statutory employer" on independent contractors who
were performing work that was part of the trade, business or occu-
pation of the project's owner.1 83 In Evans the court concluded that
the developer's trade, business or occupation was the construction
of the project, and the various independent contractors and their
employees were fellow statutory employers and employees.-8 4 As
such, the architect was not a "stranger to the employment" which
would permit the injured party to file a common law suit.8 5
In the next term, the supreme court again addressed under a
different set of facts the question whether a project architect was
immune from suit because of the Workers' Compensation Act.
This time, however, the court reached a different conclusion. In
Nichols v. VVKR, Inc.,' s6 the supreme court ruled that the archi-
tect did not enjoy immunity from a common law suit for
negligence.18 7
As in Evans, the injured party in Nichols worked for the general
contractor, and both the general contractor and the architect
worked for the project's owner. The owner in Nichols, however,
was a "public service company," the Greater Roanoke Transit
Company ("GRTC").l8 s GRTC had been organized for the purpose
181. Evans, 239 Va. at 128-29, 387 S.E.2d at 777-78.
182. Id. at 133, 387 S.E.2d at 780.
183. Id. at 129-30, 387 S.E.2d at 778 (citing Cinnamon v. IBM Corp., 238 Va. 471, 384
S.E.2d 618 (1989); and Smith v. Horn, 232 Va. 302, 351 S.E.2d 14 (1986)).
184. Id. at 130-32, 387 S.E.2d at 778-80.
185. Id. at 131-33, 387 S.E.2d at 779-80. The Evans court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the architect could not be a statutory employer under the Act because he was a solo
practitioner without employees of his own. The court cited prior authority which held that
the absence of employees did not bar an independent contractor from being a statutory
employer under the Act. Id. at 132, 387 S.E.2d at 779 (citing Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309,
130 S.E.2d 582 (1963)). Moreover, the court observed that the architect also could qualify as
a fellow "statutory employee," given that both he and the injured employee were, for the
project in question, under the common canopy of the owner's trade, business or occupation.
Id. at 131, 387 S.E.2d at 779 (citing Smith v. Horn, 232 Va. 302, 307, 351 S.E.2d 14, 17
(1986)).
186. 241 Va. 516, 403 S.E.2d 698 (1991).
187. Id. at 523, 403 S.E.2d at 702.
188. Id. at 522, 403 S.E.2d at 701-02.
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of providing mass transit services, with facility construction being
merely an incidental activity.189
The architect in Nichols advanced two arguments in support of
its immunity claim. Both arguments were designed to take advan-
tage of supreme court precedent which held that the trade, busi-
ness or occupation of a governmental entity or public utility in-
cludes construction. 9 ' First, the architect emphasized that the
construction in question had been undertaken as a joint venture by
GRTC and the City of Roanoke.' 9' The supreme court, however,
emphasized that the city participated only in the financing of the
project and that all contracts relative to the construction referred
to GRTC as owner. Thus, the supreme court concluded that the
owner, for purposes of resolving the workers' compensation issue,
was GRTC.'92
Second, the architect argued that, as a "public service com-
pany," GRTC should enjoy the same status governmental entities
or public utilities enjoy under Virginia's Workers' Compensation
Act. 193 The Nichols court rejected this argument as well. The court
noted that, unlike the situation with governmental entities and
public utilities, a public service company can voluntarily define the
scope of its business in its charter and bylaws. 94 In that regard a
public service company is like any other private business; and,
therefore, the same rules governing workers' compensation immu-
nity should apply.'95
In McBride v. Metric Constructors,98 the issue was whether,
under recent amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act ("the federal act"), an injured em-
ployee, compensated by his employer under the federal act, could
sue a party in negligence who was immune from suit under Vir-
ginia's Workers' Compensation Act ("the state act"). 97 The plain-
tiff was an employee loaned to a subcontractor who was painting a
tunnel owned by Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. ("the
owner"). After receiving compensation under the federal act from
189. Nichols, 241 Va. at 522-23, 403 S.E.2d at 701-02.
190. See Henderson v. Central Telephone Co., 233 Va. 377, 355 S.E.2d 596 (1987).
191. Nichols, 241 Va. at 519-20, 403 S.E.2d at 700-01.
192. Id. at 520, 403 S.E.2d at 701.
193. Id. at 521, 403 S.E.2d at 701.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 239 Va. 138, 387 S.E.2d 780 (1990).
197. Id. at 139, 387 S.E.2d at 781.
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his employer, the injured employee sued the owner and the general
contractor in negligence. Both defendants asserted immunity
under the state act as a defense."' o
All parties conceded in the trial court that if the state act con-
trolled, the immunity sections of that act"'9 barred the plaintiff's
state law negligence claim. 20 0 The plaintiff advanced two argu-
ments supporting his position that the state act was not control-
ling. First, plaintiff argued that he had made no claim for compen-
sation under the state act.201 The supreme court rejected this
argument. It noted that state tort law governs negligence actions
that arise out of accidents falling within the concurrent jurisdiction
of the federal and state acts.202 Under Virginia tort law, the plain-
tiff was bound by the provisions of the state act whether he filed a
claim under that act or not.203
Second, the plaintiff in McBride argued that recent amendments
to the federal act created a federal cause of action that nullified
state law immunity.204 The court rejected this argument as well,
noting that Congress enacted the amendments in reaction to a
United States Supreme Court case.205 The McBride court further
observed that the purpose of Congress' amendments was to narrow
the judicial construction of "employer" under the federal act, not
to extend exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over state tort law.20 6
198. McBride, 239 Va. at 139, 387 S.E.2d at 781.
199. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-29, -31, -40 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
200. McBride, 239 Va. at 140, 387 S.E.2d at 781.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 140-41, 387 S.E.2d at 781 (citing Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202,
211-12 (1971)).
203. Id. at 141, 389 S.E.2d at 781-82. The McBride court referred to § 65.1-23 of the Code
as establishing the tort principle that the plaintiff was governed by the state act even
though he had not sought compensation under it. Id.
204. Id. at 141, 387 S.E.2d at 782. The relevant amendments to the federal act are at 33
U.S.C. § 904(a)(1982), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 904(a) (Supp. V. 1988); and 33 U.S.C. §
905(a)(1982), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (Supp. V. 1988). The purpose of these amend-
ments, as the McBride court observed, was to clarify that a general contractor, who provides
compensation coverage to its subcontractor's employees, will acquire the immunity from
suit, as conferred by the federal act, only if the subcontractor has defaulted on its primary
obligation to obtain such coverage. McBride, 239 Va. at 141-43, 387 S.E.2d at 782-83.
205. McBride, 239 Va. at 141, 387 S.E.2d at 782-83. The United States Supreme Court
case that resulted in the amendment of the federal act was Washington Metro. Transit
Auth. v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925 (1984). In Johnson, the court had construed the federal act
to confer "employer" immunity on a general contractor, relative to the injuries of a subcon-
tractor's employee, without considering whether the subcontractor had defaulted on its obli-
gation to acquire compensation coverage under the federal act. Id. at 936.
206. McBride, 239 Va. at 143, 387 S.E.2d at 783.
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Thus, the amendments did not affect the bar to suit conferred by
the state act on the owner and general contractor in McBride.
A final case pertaining to workers' compensation coverage in the
construction context is Spruill v. C.W. Wright Construction Co.
207
In Spruill, the court of appeals considered whether an employee's
alleged "willful misconduct" barred the employee from recovering
workers' compensation benefits.208 The claimant had been em-
ployed as a lineman and was installing an electrical grounding wire
when he was severely burned. The employer had a safety rule that
no employee was to work on an "energized line" without safety
gloves. The claimant was not wearing safety gloves at the time of
his accident.20 9 The claimant, however, presented evidence to sug-
gest that, at most, he had negligently concluded that the line in
question was de-energized.2 10 The court of appeals found that this
evidence rebutted any finding of willful misconduct on the part of
the employee. Therefore, the employee's workers' compensation
claim was not barred. 11
IV. CONCLUSION
While in the past two years the General Assembly has not made
widespread statutory changes bearing on construction law matters,
in a number of cases the judiciary has dramatically changed the
rules governing this area of the law. The Virginia courts have de-
cided important cases involving the enforcement of mechanic's
liens; the applicability of Virginia's statute of repose; the obliga-
tions of performance, payment and bid bond sureties; the meaning
and enforcement of various contract terms and principles; the ex-
posure of contractors to tort claims of various kinds; and the appli-
cability of workers' compensation laws to injuries occurring on the
construction site. This article should provide the attorney who
207. 8 Va. App. 330, 381 S.E.2d 359 (1989).
208. Id. at 331, 381 S.E.2d at 359. The "willful conduct" exception bars an employee's
recovery on a workers' compensation claim if the evidence shows that the employee's injury
arose out of a purposeful decision to ignore the employer's safety rules. Id. at 333-34, 381
S.E.2d at 360-61. See Mills v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 547, 552, 90 S.E.2d 124,
127 (1955); Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Thaxton, 161 Va. 863, 871, 172 S.E.
261, 264 (1934).
209. Spruill, 8 Va. App. at 332, 381 S.E.2d at 359-60.
210. Id. at 333, 381 S.E.2d at 360-61.
211. Id. at 334, 381 S.E.2d at 361.
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deals with construction law matters a useable survey of the varied
and important changes effectuated by the Virginia legislature and
courts over the past two years.
